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ABSTRACT
Substantive due process issues implicitly concern voice. Whose voice will be
heard? Although such issues often remain submerged, the Justices occasionally trans-
late them into disputes over democratic participation and power. The Supreme Court’s
most important substantive due process decision in years, Obergefell v. Hodges, en-
tailed such a battle over democracy. The multiple dissenting opinions insisted that the
decision demeaned the opponents of same-sex marriage, many of whom were inspired
by traditional values and religious convictions. The majority explicitly disagreed,
reasoning that the case resolved the rights of same-sex couples to marry and did not
diminish the opponents’ voices. The dissenters were right—at least in part.
Obergefell necessarily demeaned traditional and religious opponents of same-
sex marriage, but nevertheless, the Court reached the correct outcome. Judicial neu-
trality is impossible, so the Court’s decision inevitably would have privileged one
voice or view over another. Although the dissenters further asserted that the majority
impaired democracy, the opposite was true. Laws that discriminate against periph-
eral groups, such as gays and lesbians, undermine the democratic process. In a well-
functioning democracy, certain issues must be off the table, beyond democratic debate.
Treating gays and lesbians as full and equal citizens in good standing is one such issue,
whether in regard to marriage or otherwise. The majority’s decision in Obergefell
ultimately bolstered the democratic process.
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INTRODUCTION
Substantive due process issues implicitly concern voice. Whose voice will be
heard?1 Although such issues often remain submerged, the Justices occasionally
* Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor
of Political Science, University of Wyoming. I thank Alan Chen, Mark Tushnet, Sam Kalen, and
Noah Novogrodsky for their comments on earlier drafts.
1 In fact, one could reasonably argue that all constitutional issues are ultimately about
voice. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 17, 19 (1970) (emphasizing
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translate them into disputes over democratic participation and power.2 The Supreme
Court’s most important substantive due process decision in years, Obergefell v.
Hodges,3 entailed such a battle over democracy.
In a five-to-four decision, Obergefell held that same-sex couples enjoy a con-
stitutional right to marry.4 The moderately conservative Justice Kennedy joined the
four progressive Justices—Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—to form a narrow
majority, with Kennedy writing the Court’s opinion.5 All the other conservatives—
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—dissented, with each
dissenter writing an opinion.6 Despite the multitude of opinions, the dissenters’ respec-
tive criticisms of the majority overlapped considerably. Scalia and Thomas each joined
the other’s dissenting opinion, while both joined the dissents of Roberts and Alito.7
The majority and dissenters clashed over substantive due process doctrine, but
such disagreement was predictable.8 Nevertheless, the multiple opinions in Obergefell
were unusual because they magnified the subtext of voice in democracy. The dissent-
ers insisted that Obergefell demeaned the opponents of same-sex marriage, many of
whom were inspired by traditional values and religious convictions.9 The decision
ostensibly sullied and disparaged their voices or views.10 The majority explicitly
voice as central to political action); Heather K. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE
L.J. 1349, 1349 (2012) (exploring Hirschman’s thesis); cf. Kay Lehman Schlozman et al., In-
equalities of Political Voice, in INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 19, 19–20 (Lawrence
R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005) (linking political voice with economic inequality).
2 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority for “judicial legislation”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 523 (1965) (Black,
J., dissenting) (arguing Court should have deferred to legislature).
3 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
4 Id. at 2604–05.
5 Id. at 2591.
6 For discussions of various quantitative rankings of the Justices’ political ideologies, see
LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 106–16 (2013). This book compares
its rankings with the Martin-Quinn scores (accounting for changes over time), MARTIN-QUINN
SCORES, PROJECT DESCRIPTION, http://www.mqscores.wustl.edu/index.php [http://perma.cc
/93UF-XNGQ], and the Segal-Cover scores (quantifying Court nominees’ perceived political
ideologies at the time of appointment), Perceived Qualifications and Ideology of Supreme
Court Nominees, 1937–2012, http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/polisci/jsegal/QualTable
.pdf [http://perma.cc/A9E6-AVV6] (data drawn from Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideo-
logical Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557–65
(1989); updated in LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 122–37 (2005)). For yet another ranking (a more flexible one across
issues), see generally Benjamin E. Lauderdale & Tom S. Clark, The Supreme Court’s Many
Median Justices, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 847 (2012).
7 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2585.
8 See infra Part I.
9 135 S. Ct. at 2624–25 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2639 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
id. at 2641–42 (Alito, J., dissenting).
10 See, e.g., id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision usurps the constitutional
right of the people to decide whether to keep or alter the traditional understanding of
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disagreed.11 Kennedy’s opinion reasoned that the decision resolved the rights of
same-sex couples to marry and did not diminish the opponents’ voices.12
The dissenters repudiated and even ridiculed Kennedy’s claim about voice.13
“[W]hat really astounds,” wrote Scalia, “is the hubris reflected in today’s judicial
Putsch.”14 All of the dissenting opinions argued that the Court should have deferred
the question of same-sex marriage to the democratic process.15 Let the advocates for
same-sex marriage and their opponents, including the religiously faithful, battle
against each other in the democratic arena.16 Let all voices be heard, not only those of
the five Justices in the Obergefell majority.17 Many conservative commentators and
politicians echoed the dissenters.18 They insisted that the decision affronted tradi-
tional values and religious liberty.19 Ken Paxton, the Attorney General of Texas, de-
nounced Obergefell as a “lawless ruling.”20 He issued an advisory opinion stating
that the decision did not compel government employees, including judges, justices
of the peace, and county clerks, to facilitate same-sex marriages in violation of their
religious beliefs and liberties.21 Jim Daly, of Focus on the Family, declared that
marriage. . . . [I]t will be used to vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new
orthodoxy.”); id. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Perhaps the most discouraging aspect
of today’s decision is the extent to which the majority feels compelled to sully those on the
other side of the debate.”).
11 See, e.g., id. at 2594, 2605 (majority opinion).
12 Id.
13 See, e.g., id. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2629–30 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id.
at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 2611–12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2626–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at
2631–32 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 2611–12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2626–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at
2631–32 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting).
17 See id. at 2611–12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
18 See, e.g., Press Release, Attorney General of Texas, Ken Paxton, Religious Liberties of
Texas Public Officials Remain Constitutionally Protected After Obergefell v. Hodges (June 28,
2015), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/static/5144.html [http://perma.cc/QUJ5-MF7E].
19 See, e.g., Adam Freedman, Obergefell’s Threat to Religious Liberty, CITY J. (July 1,
2015), http://www.city-journal.org/2015/eon0701af.html [http://perma.cc/NXQ8-BJ2M]. Even
an editorial praising the decision added: “We find it worrisome that the majority opinion
barely flicks at the conflicts between the newly affirmed constitutional right to same-sex
marriage and the religious freedoms that have been enshrined in the charter for centuries.”
Editorial Board, Editorial, Supreme Court Says ‘Yes’ to Marriage, CHI. TRIB. (June 26, 2015),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-samesex-marriage-scotus-edit
-0628-20150626-story.html [http://perma.cc/G4Y2-59RN].
20 Press Release, supra note 18.
21 Att’y Gen. Ken Paxton, Opinion No. KP-0025 (June 28, 2015), https://www.texasattor
neygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/51paxton/op/2015/kp0025.pdf [http://perma.cc/6CMK
-E2BT]. The Fifth Circuit, however, soon followed with an opinion underscoring that
Obergefell was the law of the land and must be followed. De Leon v. Abbott, 791 F.3d 619,
624–25 (5th Cir. 2015).
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Obergefell not only “tramples on the democratic process” but also “will fan the flames
of government hostility” against religious opponents of same-sex marriage.22
The dissenters and their political supporters were right, at least in part. Despite
Kennedy’s assertion that the Court’s decision did not demean traditional and reli-
gious opponents of same-sex marriage,23 judicial neutrality is impossible. All sub-
stantive due process issues require the Court to decide about voice in democracy.
After Obergefell, opponents can still express themselves, but they are democratically
disempowered. They can no longer implement their viewpoints in government laws
or policies.24
Even so, the Court correctly decided Obergefell. If judicial neutrality is impossible,
and if a judicial decision inevitably privileges one voice or view over another, then the
Court’s disparaging of traditional and religious voices is beside the point. And al-
though the dissenters asserted that the majority impaired democracy, the opposite was
true. Laws that discriminate against peripheral groups, such as gays and lesbians, un-
dermine the democratic process. In a well-functioning democracy, certain issues must
be off the table and beyond democratic debate. Treating gays and lesbians as full and
equal citizens in good standing is one such issue, whether with regard to marriage or
otherwise.25 Even if a supermajority of Americans were to support a law discrim-
inating against gays and lesbians, such government action must be unconstitutional
because it would relegate gays and lesbians to second-class democratic citizenship.
Ultimately then, the Obergefell decision bolstered the democratic process.
Part I of this Article explores the issue of voice in substantive due process disputes,
particularly in Obergefell. Part I emphasizes the Justices’ disagreements about the
nature and significance of tradition in substantive due process cases. Part II explores
the relationship between voice and democracy and argues that the Court correctly de-
cided Obergefell because of the democratic process. Part III explains and rejects the
dissenters’ argument that the majority opinion resurrected the discredited approach
of Lochner v. New York.26
I. WHOSE VOICE MATTERS?
The dissenters repeatedly insisted that the majority’s Obergefell decision would
suppress the voices or views of opponents of same-sex marriage.27 “Perhaps the
22 Jim Daly, Jim Daly Statement on Supreme Court Ruling on Marriage, FOCUS ON FAMILY
(June 26, 2015), http://www.focusonthefamily.com/about_us/news_room/news-releases/2015
/20150626-jim-daly-statement-on-supreme-court-ruling-on-marriage.aspx [http://perma.cc
/YYU7-G7FL].
23 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594, 2605 (2015).
24 Id. at 2605.
25 See JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 5, 61 (2012) (explaining how hate
speech can undermine vulnerable minorities, causing groups to seek assurances that they are
equal citizens in good standing).
26 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
27 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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most discouraging aspect of today’s decision,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “is the
extent to which the majority feels compelled to sully those on the other side of the
debate.”28 Roberts accused Justice Kennedy’s opinion of piling “assaults on the char-
acter of fairminded people” who believe marriage must be only between a man and
a woman.29 The dissenters emphasized that Obergefell undermined tradition and de-
meaned the religiously faithful.30 The Obergefell decision, Justice Alito concluded,
“will be used to vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy
[protecting same-sex marriage].”31
Kennedy’s majority opinion maintained that, contrary to the dissenters’ arguments,
the decision did not discredit religious and other traditional viewpoints.32 “Many who
deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion,” according to Kennedy,
“based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they
nor their beliefs are disparaged here.”33 The majority emphasized that traditionalists,
including the religiously faithful, can still maintain and advocate for their positions
against same-sex marriage.34
[T]hose who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to ad-
vocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts,
same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First Amend-
ment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given
proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so
fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own
deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long
revered. The same is true of those who oppose same-sex marriage
for other reasons.35
But crucially, the majority concluded that opposition to same-sex marriage can
no longer be embodied in legislative actions or policies either prohibiting same-sex
marriage or defining marriage as between a man and a woman.36 After Obergefell,
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Justice Alito insisted that “the majority facilitates the marginalization of the many
Americans who have traditional ideas,” id. at 2643 (Alito, J., dissenting), while Justice Thomas
proclaimed that “the majority’s decision threatens the religious liberty our Nation has long
sought to protect,” id. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also id. at 2625–26 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing “the traditional definition of marriage” and potential problems for
“people of faith”); id. at 2642–43 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasizing rights of conscience).
31 Id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting).
32 Id. at 2602, 2607 (majority opinion).
33 Id. at 2602.
34 Id. at 2607.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 2605–06.
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same-sex couples are constitutionally guaranteed “marriage on the same terms as
accorded to couples of the opposite sex.”37
So, does Obergefell diminish the voices of traditionalists? On this point, the dis-
senters were right. When the Supreme Court held that governments cannot prohibit
same-sex marriage, the voices of opponents of same-sex marriage were diminished.
Kennedy’s majority opinion incorrectly reasoned that the decision did not demean reli-
gious and other traditional viewpoints. Kennedy implicitly asserted neutrality: that
the Court favored no particular political outlook.38 However, in Obergefell, as in most
constitutional law cases, there is no neutrality.39 The Court might claim neutrality, but
one side always loses. When the Court invalidates a statute, including a statute prohib-
iting same-sex marriage, the supporters of the statute obviously have lost. Nonethe-
less, I mean more than this conspicuous point—that either the petitioners or respondents
win the case while the other loses. Rather, in many cases, the Court’s decision has
ramifications that reverberate through society.40 The Obergefell decision privileged
the views of same-sex marriage proponents over the views of traditionalists and the
religiously faithful who oppose same-sex marriage. Such judicial privileging will in-
fluence many individuals who were not parties to the lawsuit. In Obergefell, Alito’s
prediction about the future might be accurate: “[T]hose who cling to old beliefs will
be able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their homes, but if they repeat
those views in public, they will risk being labeled as bigots and treated as such by
governments, employers, and schools.”41
This inherent lack of neutrality is one reason that the Justices frequently dispute
the nature and significance of tradition in substantive due process cases.42 One group
37 Id. at 2607. The majority added that denying same-sex couples equal access to marriage
stigmatizes gays and lesbians. Id. at 2602.
38 See, e.g., id. at 2597 (“Numerous cases about same-sex marriage have reached the United
States Courts of Appeals in recent years. In accordance with the judicial duty to base their
decisions on . . . neutral discussions, . . . courts have written a substantial body of law consid-
ering all sides of these issues. That case law helps to explain and formulate the underlying prin-
ciples this Court now must consider.”).
39 See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION 7–9 (2001) (arguing that
the Constitution helps prevent political disputes from becoming too settled). One might reason-
ably conclude that every constitutional decision contains the trace of an “Other.” Stephen M.
Feldman, The Problem of Critique: Triangulating Habermas, Derrida, and Gadamer Within
Metamodernism, 4 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 296, 307–08 (2005) (discussing justice and the
Other); Stephen M. Feldman, Made For Each Other: The Interdependence of Deconstruction
and Philosophical Hermeneutics, 26 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 51, 57–63 (2000) (discussing
hermeneutics, deconstruction, and the Other).
40 As I discuss below, however, I do not mean to suggest that the Court alone substantially
changes society. Rather, I am arguing that the Court’s decision can influence society.
41 135 S. Ct. at 2642–43 (Alito, J., dissenting).
42 On the difficulty of defining tradition and culture, see JOHN TOMLINSON, CULTURAL
IMPERIALISM 96–97 (1991) (discussing the problem of defining culture); Sarah Song, Majority
Norms, Multiculturalism, and Gender Equality, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 473, 474–76 (2005)
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of Justices—the conservative Justices, for the most part—are skeptical about the
judicial recognition of substantive due process rights.43 They seek to confine the scope
of due process as much as possible. To do so, they maintain that due process protects
only “those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition.’”44 The prototypical majority opinion relying on
this narrow approach to substantive due process is Washington v. Glucksberg, which
refused to recognize a right to assisted suicide.45 From this perspective, few rights are
rooted deeply enough in American tradition to come within the compass of due pro-
cess protection. Moreover, the meaning and scope of due process is static—fixed as
an objective matter. Indeed, this narrow approach shrivels the judicial protection of
substantive due process to near emptiness. After all, how often will a legislature pass
a law contravening a right that the Court deems deeply rooted in American history?
Other Justices conceptualize the nature and significance of tradition in substantive
due process cases differently. These Justices—the progressive and some moderately
conservative Justices—view tradition as evolving.46 Souter stated that “tradition is
a living thing.”47 In Obergefell, Kennedy’s majority opinion acknowledged the long
tradition of marriage as being between a man and a woman.48 However, Kennedy
continued and argued that the institution of marriage “has not stood in isolation from
(discussing different ways to define culture). “Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal
suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs . . . .”
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (1973). Geertz added: “[C]ulture
consists of socially established structures of meaning . . . .” Id. at 12; see DICK HEBDIGE,
SUBCULTURE: THE MEANING OF STYLE 129 (1979) (defining culture as “systems of com-
munication, forms of expression and representation”). “The conception I work with is a def-
inition of culture as a shared organization of ideas that includes the intellectual, moral, and
aesthetic standards prevalent in a community and the meanings of communicative actions.”
Robert A. LeVine, Properties of Culture: An Ethnographic View, in CULTURE THEORY: ESSAYS
ON MIND, SELF, AND EMOTION 67, 67 (Richard A. Shweder & Robert A. LeVine eds., 1984).
Gadamer elaborates on the concept of tradition within the context of hermeneutics. HANS-
GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD xxi, 89, 137, 140, 144, 159, 164–65, 295, 309, 462,
477–91 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 2004). For discussions of
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, see GEORGIA WARNKE, GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS, TRADITION, AND
REASON (1987); JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF TRUTH
AND METHOD (1985).
43 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 735–36. For additional opinions using this narrow approach, see Obergefell, 135
S. Ct. at 2618 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting); Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that
state could proscribe homosexual sodomy); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595.
47 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 765, 770 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 542–43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
48 135 S. Ct. at 2594.
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developments in law and society.”49 “The history of marriage is one of both continuity
and change.”50 Most cultures today still honor the institution of marriage, yet unlike
in the past, parents rarely arrange marriages for their children.51 Furthermore, women
who marry are no longer subject to the common law of coverture, under which women
lost their independent legal identities and rights.52 The Obergefell approach under-
stands tradition as neither static nor objective. Moreover, an inquiry into tradition is
not the be-all and end-all of a substantive due process inquiry.53 The Justices respect
and learn from history “without allowing the past alone to rule the present.”54
The Justices’ dispute over the nature or definition of tradition and its significance
to substantive due process manifests the constant struggle over voice in constitutional
law.55 When the due process skeptics limit fundamental rights to those deeply rooted
in American tradition, they do not imagine tradition from a multicultural perspective.
These Justices are mostly the same ones who advocate for and follow originalist meth-
ods of constitutional interpretation.56 They believe constitutional meaning is objec-
tive and fixed at the time of framing or ratification.57 To be blunt, when they analyze
the original meaning of due process in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, they do
not inquire into the cultural traditions of African American slaves, women, recent
immigrants, or gays and lesbians. Deeply rooted traditions, for these Justices, equate
with the traditions of the mainstream, the culturally dominant—namely, through most
of American history, white Protestant heterosexual men. When these Justices contem-
plated same-sex marriage in Obergefell, they cared about protecting the mainstream
49 Id. at 2595.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 2589 (“History and tradition guide and discipline [a due process analysis] but do
not set its outer boundaries.”).
54 Id. at 2598. Prior opinions articulating and following this conceptualization of tradition
include the following: Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 765, 770 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
55 “Individual freedom requires having options from which to choose, and it is cultures
[or traditions] that provide and give meaning to these options.” Song, supra note 42, at 473; see
also GEERTZ, supra note 42, at 27 (“Without men, no culture, certainly; but equally, and more
significantly, without culture, no men.”).
56 On the Roberts Court, Scalia and Thomas are avowed originalists, but the other con-
servative Justices also invoke originalist arguments and join originalist opinions. See, e.g.,
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–626 (2008) (relying on originalism to inter-
pret the Second Amendment). See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (advocating for originalism).
57 Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 660 (2009); see Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 4 (2011) (emphasizing the “fixation thesis” of
originalism). For a critique of originalism, see Stephen M. Feldman, Constitutional Interpre-
tation and History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 283 (2014).
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voices of American tradition rather than the voices emanating from the subcultures
and traditions of homosexual communities.58
The Obergefell majority’s approach to substantive due process is more flexible
and more likely to encompass the voices or views of peripheral and emerging societal
groups.59 Under this flexible approach, the voices of peripheral groups matter even
though they are not necessarily deeply rooted in mainstream American tradition.
Because tradition grows, the Justices might reason that a peripheral group, previously
excluded from deeply rooted traditions, narrowly defined, should now be understood
as within an evolving American cultural milieu.60 Tradition, from this standpoint, is
dynamic rather than static. Hence, in Obergefell, the majority opinion not only traced
the changing societal conceptions of marriage but also the evolution of attitudes to-
ward homosexuality. Given these cultural changes, several states had already imple-
mented judicial or legislative processes to legalize same-sex marriages.61
The Justices who follow the flexible approach also consider potential substantive
due process rights derived through means other than the analysis of tradition, narrow
or otherwise.62 Typically, these Justices analyze whether government action infringes
one of two interests: an interest in making important personal decisions or an inter-
est in intimate associations.63 These interests frequently overlap, so the Justices might
emphasize that a case involves personal decisions concerning intimacy.64 If the gov-
ernment has infringed one or both of these interests, then the Court will find an abridg-
ment of substantive due process.65 In many cases, the Court allows the government
58 Scalia explicitly discussed the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and due
process, while emphasizing the “long tradition” of limiting marriage to same-sex couples.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see id. at 2637 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(invoking “the original meaning of liberty”).
59 Id. at 2590 (majority opinion) (noting that “new insights and societal understanding can
reveal unjustified inequality . . . that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged”).
60 See GADAMER, supra note 42, at 282, 293 (discussing how traditions change); Dan
Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 536 (2004) (explaining how background beliefs change).
61 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597.
62 Id. at 2602 (explaining that fundamental rights can also arise from “a better informed
understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our
own era”).
63 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (reasoning that the right of privacy “is broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–86 (1965) (emphasizing association and intimate
relationship of marriage).
64 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (emphasizing choice to enter
intimate relationship involving homosexual conduct); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (emphasizing in abortion case “intimate and personal choices” related
to marriage, procreation, and so on).
65 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (declaring that decisions “involving the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime . . . are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment”).
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to attempt to justify such abridgment.66 For instance, if the government can satisfy
strict scrutiny by showing that its action is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
purpose, then the Court would uphold the government action.67 Rarely, though, can
the government satisfy strict scrutiny.68
In sum, when the Justices battle over the definition and significance of tradition,
they struggle over whose voice will matter. The skeptical Obergefell dissenters’ nar-
row concept of tradition69 magnifies the importance of mainstream and old-stock
Americans. The Obergefell majority’s flexible notion of tradition creates more space
for the voices of peripheral and historically suppressed groups.70 The Justices on both
sides of the debate understand that tradition is a powerful force. It is dynamic, but
it also has inertia.71 In most instances, it does not change easily or quickly. Alito’s
Obergefell dissent brooded about the negative consequences of the decision for tradi-
tionalists and the religiously faithful.72 Their views, he worried, would be demeaned.73
But we should not forget that many of those same traditionalists and faithful—those
“fairminded people” that Roberts fretted about—will continue to denounce homo-
sexuality as abhorrent or sinful or both.74 Obergefell, standing alone, will not terminate
66 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (explaining that in cases
subject to strict scrutiny, it is the government’s burden to prove that the law in question is
“unquestionably legitimate”).
67 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (explaining that certain laws are consti-
tutional “only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests”).
68 E.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–64 (inquiring whether state anti-abortion law was necessary
to achieve compelling purpose). In abortion cases, specifically, the Court has switched to an
undue burden test. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874. To a large degree, Kennedy’s majority opinion
in Obergefell followed this framework of analysis. Once Kennedy emphasized that the major-
ity would not be straitjacketed by the Glucksberg approach to tradition and due process, he
analyzed whether the denial of marriage to same-sex couples infringed the couples’ interests
in making important personal decisions and intimate associations. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584, 2599–2600 (2015). Kennedy invoked, for instance, a “right to personal choice re-
garding marriage [as] inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.” Id. at 2599. Kennedy did
not extensively discuss strict scrutiny or a similar framework of analysis; he briefly dismissed
the claim that same-sex marriage will interfere with the institution of opposite-sex marriage.
Id. at 2606–07.
69 Id. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that until recently, marriage had been
perceived as a union between a man and a woman, and this is reflected in human history.
Also explaining that marriage arose to meet “a vital need: ensuring that children are conceived
by a mother and a father committed to raising them in the stable conditions of a lifelong
relationship”).
70 Id. at 2590 (majority opinion) (explaining that “the Nation’s traditions make clear that
marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s social order. . . . There is no difference between same-
and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle”).
71 Gadamer’s concept of the hermeneutic circle suggests this dual nature of tradition.
GADAMER, supra note 42, at 281.
72 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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a deeply rooted tradition of bias and antipathy toward gays and lesbians. Likewise,
Obergefell, standing alone, will not lead to the widespread condemnation of tradi-
tional and religious opponents of same-sex marriage. Supreme Court decisions, in-
cluding Obergefell, do not wield sufficient power to change society independently
of other societal and cultural forces.75
This discussion of voice and suppression raises an additional question. If, as I
argue, the dissenters were right—if Obergefell diminishes the voices of opponents of
same-sex marriage—then was the decision incorrect?
II. DEMOCRACY AND OBERGEFELL
An assessment of the Obergefell result requires a discussion of democracy. Every
dissenter in Obergefell accused the majority of undermining democratic processes.76
“Today’s decision,” wrote Alito, “usurps the constitutional right of the people to de-
cide whether to keep or alter the traditional understanding of marriage.”77 By failing
to exercise judicial restraint, the majority invaded the legislative sphere.78 “[T]his Court
is not a legislature,” explained Roberts.79 “Although the policy arguments for extending
marriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal arguments for requiring
such an extension are not.”80 The Court, according to this view, should have deferred
to the legislative power of the people and allowed each state to determine how to
define marriage.81 As Scalia put it, “This is a naked judicial claim to legislative—
indeed, super-legislative—power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system
of government.”82
Predictably, this line of attack on a substantive due process decision such as
Obergefell led the dissenters to drag out the hoary ghost of Lochner.83 “[T]he majority’s
75 See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions,
82 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996) (explaining why “the myth of the heroically countermajoritarian
Court” persists despite “consistently contravening evidence”). See generally GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991)
(arguing that courts can rarely generate social reform).
76 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611–12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2627 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2631–32 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2640–41 (Alito, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting). “By straying from the text of the Constitution, sub-
stantive due process exalts judges at the expense of the People from whom they derive their
authority.” Id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(denigrating the decision as a “judicial Putsch”).
82 Id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Roberts’s dissent is the only one to discuss
Lochner explicitly, but Scalia and Thomas joined Roberts’s opinion. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct.
at 2611–12, 2616–22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing Lochner repeatedly).
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approach has no basis in principle or tradition,” wrote Roberts, “except for the
unprincipled tradition of judicial policy-making that characterized discredited deci-
sions such as Lochner v. New York.”84 As Roberts traced in detail, Lochner exempli-
fied an era in Supreme Court adjudication running from the late nineteenth century
to approximately 1937.85 Lochner itself invalidated a state law that limited the num-
ber of hours employees could work in bakeries (ten hours per day and sixty hours per
week) as violating substantive due process.86 Although Justice Holmes’s famous
Lochner dissent maintained that the Court should have deferred to the state legislature,87
the Court continued throughout the Lochner era to invalidate numerous economic regu-
lations, numbering nearly two hundred state and federal laws (the Court also upheld
many laws).88 But, as Roberts emphasized, the Court eventually repudiated its Lochner
approach and, for decades, showed greater deference to the democratic process.89 In
Obergefell, however, “the majority casts caution aside and revives the grave errors
of [the Lochner] period”—at least according to Roberts.90
If the dissenters were partly right about voice and suppression, as I argue above,
then are they also right about democracy and the resurrection of Lochner? That is,
did the Court wrongly decide Obergefell by not deferring to the legislature by not
allowing the people to decide whether to allow same-sex marriage? In fact, Roberts
explicitly related democracy to voice and suppression.91 “There will be consequences
to shutting down the political process on an issue of such profound public signifi-
cance,” he warned.92 “Closing debate tends to close minds. People denied a voice are
less likely to accept the ruling of a court on an issue that does not seem to be the sort
of thing courts usually decide.”93 He even added that proponents of same-sex marriage
have also lost, missing an opportunity for democratic victory, “to win the true accep-
tance that comes from persuading their fellow citizens of the justice of their cause.”94
But Roberts and the other dissenters were wrong about the Obergefell result. The
Court decided the case correctly. As the dissenters suggested, democracy provided
84 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 2617.
86 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (proclaiming that the New York statute which placed restric-
tions on employment of bakers violated the liberty guaranteed to citizens by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
87 Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (recommending def-
erence to legislature).
88 See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating
minimum wage law); see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 632 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing number of laws invalidated during Lochner era);
KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM 111–17 (1991) (same).
89 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 2621.
91 Id. at 2625.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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the key to the case, but their concept of democracy was too simplistic. At least since
the 1930s, American democracy has rested on process rather than on the identification
and pursuit of a specific substantive goal, such as the common good.95 As articulated
by constitutional and political theorists during and after World War II,96 post-1930s
(pluralist) democracy required the institutionalization of a process that would determine
which interests would be at least temporarily enshrined as communal goals.97 Robert
Dahl, more so than any other theorist, analyzed the conditions or prerequisites neces-
sary for a proper pluralist democratic process.98 Dahl reasoned, for example, that each
citizen’s vote must be identically weighed and that the option or choice receiving the
greatest number of votes must be accepted and implemented.99 But the most founda-
tional element of the process, Dahl concluded, is “effective participation.”100 Citizens
must have “adequate” and “equal” opportunities “for expressing their preferences . . .
for placing questions on the agenda and for expressing reasons for endorsing one out-
come rather than another.”101
Democracy, according to this analysis, contains inherent limits. If the crux of the
democratic process is effective participation, then a legislature cannot enact a law that
would abridge citizens’ abilities and opportunities to participate—even if a super-
majority of citizens and legislators favored the enactment. Any such law would under-
mine the democratic process itself and would necessarily be unconstitutional.102
Claims to democratic legitimacy would be hollow and specious. For instance, if a state
legislature passes a law denying the right to vote to a segment of citizens—say, cit-
izens of a particular race or ethnicity—that voting restriction and all subsequent
legislative actions would be illegitimate.103 Rights embodied by these inherent limits
95 See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY
291–348 (2008) (discussing the transition from republican democracy, focusing on the com-
mon good, to pluralist democracy).
96 Robert Dahl was the leading theorist of democracy during this era. See generally ROBERT
A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989) [hereinafter DAHL, DEMOCRACY]; ROBERT A.
DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter DAHL, PREFACE]. Other leading
theorists include the following: WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALCOLM C. MOOS, A GRAMMAR OF
AMERICAN POLITICS (2d ed. 1952); V.O. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS (2d
ed. 1950); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951).
97 DAHL, DEMOCRACY, supra note 96, at 83, 106; DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 96, at 67–71.
98 DAHL, DEMOCRACY, supra note 96, at 108–15 (explaining that the five criteria for a
proper democratic process are effective participation, voting equality at the decisive stage,
enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and equal opportunity).
99 Id. at 109–11; DAHL, PREFACE, supra note 96, at 67.
100 DAHL, DEMOCRACY, supra note 96, at 109.
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938)
(reasoning that deference to the legislature would be inappropriate if legislation either would
likely cause or had resulted from defective democratic processes); DAHL, DEMOCRACY, supra
note 96, at 170.
103 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 116–24 (1980) (emphasizing the need
for judicial protection of the right to vote). Subsequent legislative actions would be illegitimate
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of democracy can be labeled as procedural or substantive, or as bridging both process
and substance. Free expression, to give one example, can be considered a procedural
or substantive right—the label is unimportant. However, if a legislative enactment
denies or restricts the right to speak about political issues, then democracy no longer
exists.104 Therefore, a law denying to gays and lesbians (or any other members of the
LGBT community, for that matter) the right to vote or the right to political speech
would contravene democracy and be unconstitutional.
But what about a law (or other government action) that otherwise discriminates
against a discrete societal group or treats that group unequally or differently from
other similar groups in society? Or more precisely, what about a law that discriminates
against gays and lesbians by prohibiting same-sex marriage? Although such a discrim-
inatory law does not contravene democracy as overtly as does a law denying the vote
or political speech, it still undermines democracy and should be unconstitutional. A
discriminatory law treats an individual group member differently (or unequally) from
other citizens exactly because he or she belongs to the designated group—gays and
lesbians in this case—and the group is denigrated precisely because it is different from
the mainstream.105 Some component of the group’s identity ostensibly justifies treating
gays and lesbians as less than full and equal citizens in good standing.106 A discrimi-
natory law sends a message that gays and lesbians should not get too comfortable be-
cause many other Americans would gladly mistreat them or cast them out altogether.
In such a social and political environment, gays and lesbians cannot possibly partici-
pate in democratic negotiations, coalitions, or compromises on an equal basis with
other citizens. The political strength of gays and lesbians is diminished before the
democratic process even gets underway. Discriminatory laws mute the voices of gays
and lesbians, thus allowing other citizens to readily discredit or ignore their values
and interests.107
In Plessy v. Ferguson,108 decided in 1896, Justice Harlan’s dissent emphasized that
a racially discriminatory law has ramifications far beyond the specifics of the statute.109
The Court upheld a Louisiana statute that required railroad companies to provide
because the legislature would be unrepresentative, as members of the racial or ethnic group
were unable to vote for representatives. See id. at 116, 120–21.
104 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
18, 26 (1948). The need to protect free expression as part of the democratic process is
sometimes referred to as the self-governance rationale. See FELDMAN, supra note 95, at
396–401 (explaining the growing importance of the self-governance rationale).
105 See WALDRON, supra note 25, at 61 (discussing how hate speech denigrates a group).
106 See id. at 5 (discussing hate speech and being treated “as a member of society in good
standing”).
107 See ELY, supra note 103, at 135–79 (discussing how courts can facilitate the represen-
tation of minorities).
108 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
109 Id. at 557–58 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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separate but equal accommodations for African American and white passengers.110
The majority opinion rejected “the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority.”111 Harlan disagreed:
The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only
stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and irritating, upon the
admitted rights of colored citizens, but will encourage the belief
that it is possible, by means of state enactments, to defeat the be-
neficent purposes which the people of the United States had in
view when they adopted the [Reconstruction] amendments of the
Constitution. . . . What can more certainly arouse race hate, what
more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between
these races, than state enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the
ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they
cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white
citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of such legis-
lation as was enacted in Louisiana.112
Subsequent history unfortunately proved that Harlan was correct.113 African Ameri-
cans suffered through decades of second-class citizenship (and continue to suffer from
the effects of discrimination).114
Likewise, in Obergefell, Kennedy’s majority opinion rightly characterized how
legislative prohibitions on same-sex marriage detrimentally affect gays and lesbians.115
110 Id. at 550–51 (majority opinion).
111 Id. at 551.
112 Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
113 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (rejecting the notion that the racial classi-
fication at issue applied equally to whites because the purpose of the law was to “maintain
White Supremacy”). See generally DONNIE WILLIAMS WITH WAYNE GREENHAW, THE THUN-
DER OF ANGELS 45–84 (2006) (explaining that the civil disobedience of African Americans
regarding their refusal to comply with racially discriminatory laws and standards for bus trans-
portation ultimately led to the first major event of the civil rights movement: the Montgomery
Bus Boycott).
114 DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 373 (2d ed. 1980) (detailing
discrimination in public schools). There are many helpful histories describing African American
experiences during the twentieth century. See, e.g., JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & EVELYN BROOKS
HIGGINBOTHAM, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (9th ed. 2011); IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIR-
MATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE (2005); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975); MANNING
MARABLE, MALCOLM X: A LIFE OF REINVENTION (2011); THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF
LIBERTY (2008); THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS (1996).
115 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590–91 (2015) (explaining that laws prohibiting same-sex marriage
burden the liberty of same-sex couples, are inherently unequal, and “disrespect and subordinate
gays and lesbians”).
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“[E]xclusion from [marriage] has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are
unequal in important respects,” Kennedy wrote.116 When the government denies same-
sex couples equal access to marriage, “a central institution of the Nation’s society,”117
the government stigmatizes and “demeans gays and lesbians.”118 Legislative prohibi-
tions “disparage their choices and diminish their personhood.”119
Any individual who is a full and equal citizen in good standing should be “entitled
to the same liberties, protections, and powers” that all other citizens enjoy.120 Each
individual, regardless of whether he or she is gay or lesbian, should be able “to walk
down the street without fear of insult or humiliation, to find the shops and exchanges
open to him, and to proceed with an implicit assurance of being able to interact with
others without being treated as a pariah.”121 If the government discriminates against
gays and lesbians by treating them as less than full and equal citizens, then democracy
is necessarily stunted.
Yet, traditional and religious opponents of same-sex marriage also deserve to
be treated as full and equal citizens in the democratic process. The First Amendment
explicitly protects religious freedom.122 But all full and equal citizens—including
traditionalists and the religiously faithful—must have diminished democratic power
if and when they advocate for the discriminatory or unequal treatment of a societal
group, such as gays and lesbians, based on that group’s ascriptive qualities or differ-
ences from the mainstream. History is filled with persecutions of peripheral group
members justified ostensibly because of religious beliefs, and such persecutions often
were implemented through democratic channels.123 During and before the Civil War,
to take one example, numerous Southerners defended slavery as harmonious with or
even mandated by Christianity and the Bible.124 In the introduction to Cotton Is King,
published in 1860, E.N. Elliott explained: “We understand the nature of the negro
race; and in the relation in which the providence of God has placed them to us, they
are happy and useful members of society . . . .”125 Albert Taylor Bledsoe, a professor
116 Id. at 2602.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 WALDRON, supra note 25, at 219–20.
121 Id. at 220.
122 U.S. CONST. amend. I (including Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses).
123 See infra notes 124–27 and accompanying text.
124 See Drew Gilpin Faust, A Southern Stewardship: The Intellectual and the Proslavery
Argument, reprinted in PROSLAVERY THOUGHT, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICS 129, 137–39 (Paul
Finkelman ed., 1989) (emphasizing pro-slavery reliance on Bible and Christianity); Ferenc
M. Szasz, Antebellum Appeals to the “Higher Law,” 1830–1860, 110 ESSEX INST. HIST.
COLLECTIONS 33, 37–41 (1974) (same).
125 E.N. Elliott, Introduction to COTTON IS KING, AND PRO-SLAVERY ARGUMENTS ix (E.N.
Elliott ed., Augusta: Pritchard, Abbot & Loomis 1860); see Thornton Stringfellow, A Scriptural
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at the University of Virginia, explained that “the institution of slavery, as it exists
among us at the South, is founded in political justice, is in accordance with the will
of God and the designs of his providence, and is conducive to the highest, purest, best
interests of mankind.”126 Meanwhile, at least through the early nineteenth century,
religious minorities were subject to prosecutions for blasphemy if they repudiated
mainstream Protestantism.127 In 1837, a Delaware court stated that it had “been long
perfectly settled by the common law, that blasphemy against the Deity in general, or
a malicious and wanton attack against the christian religion individually, for the purpose
of exposing its doctrines to contempt and ridicule, is indictable and punishable.”128 If
we properly understand the democratic process, however, then religious tenets should
never justify such discriminatory government actions.129
In a well-functioning democracy, some issues must be off the table. For instance,
we should no longer debate whether racial minorities are entitled to full and equal
participation in the democratic process. The Obergefell dissenters insisted otherwise,
though. They insisted that the issue of discrimination against gays and lesbians, as
manifested in prohibitions of same-sex marriage, should be subject to further and
continuing debate in the democratic arena.130 The dissenters, in effect, declared: let
the proponents of same-sex marriage and the opponents, including the religiously
faithful, battle against each other on a level democratic field.131 According to the
View of Slavery, reprinted in SLAVERY DEFENDED: THE VIEWS OF THE OLD SOUTH 86, 86–98
(Eric L. McKitrick ed., 1963) (drawing on the Bible to advocate for slavery).
126 Albert Taylor Bledsoe, Liberty and Slavery: Or, Slavery in the Light of Moral and
Political Philosophy, in COTTON IS KING, AND PRO-SLAVERY ARGUMENTS 271, 273 (E.N.
Elliott ed., Augusta: Pritchard, Abbot & Loomis 1860). “American Slavery is not only not
a sin, but especially commanded by God through Moses, and approved by Christ through his
apostles.” J.H. Hammond, Hammond’s Letters on Slavery (Jan. 28, 1845), in THE PRO-
SLAVERY ARGUMENT: AS MAINTAINED BY THE MOST DISTINGUISHED WRITERS OF THE SOUTH-
ERN STATES 99, 108 (Charleston: Walker, Richards & Co. 1852).
127 LEONARD W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY 400–23 (1993) (discussing early nineteenth-century
blasphemy convictions in state courts); cf. NAOMI W. COHEN, JEWS IN CHRISTIAN AMERICA
38–39 (1992) (discussing mission societies’ consignment of Jews to second class citizenship
in the early nineteenth century). For examples of blasphemy convictions, see the following:
Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206 (1838); People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290
(N.Y. 1811); City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508 (1848).
128 State v. Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553, 555 (1837); see also Bradwell v. Illinois, 84 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130, 141–42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (upholding law prohibiting women
from practicing law because consistent with “the law of the Creator”).
129 Thus, for instance, antimiscegenation laws are unconstitutional, regardless of the tradi-
tional or religious motivations of proponents of such laws. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
130 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611–12 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id.
at 2626–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2637–39 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 2611–12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2626–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at
2637–39 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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dissenters, the Court should have remained neutral, treating the two sides or viewpoints
consistently.132 Let the people, rather than the Justices, decide.
However, the Obergefell Court had to decide: neutrality was impossible. The
Justices would either uphold or invalidate laws prohibiting same-sex marriage. And
crucially, the two sides in the dispute were not equal or the same. True, both sides
sought or intended to implement their own respective views of marriage, but only one
side rooted its intent in discriminatory motivations. One side, the proponents of same-
sex marriage, sought to enjoy equal rights and liberties with all others, while the other
side, the opponents, sought to prevent them from doing so.133 As Justice Stevens stated
in his dissent in Adarand Constructors v. Pena,134 an affirmative action case, “An
interest in ‘consistency’ does not justify treating differences as though they were
similarities.”135 And gays and lesbians have not historically enjoyed the same legal
and social rights as have traditionalists and the religiously faithful. Thus, despite the dis-
senters’ calls for judicial neutrality and further democratic debate, the Court correctly
treated full and equal citizenship for gays and lesbians as among the “settled features
of the social environment to which we are visibly and pervasively committed.”136 The
fact that opponents of same-sex marriage drew inspiration from tradition or religion
was beside the point. Further democratic debate would necessarily appear to legiti-
mate continued discrimination against gays and lesbians, and such discrimination
would in turn diminish their full and equal ability to participate in the democratic
process.137 The Obergefell majority reached the proper conclusion: traditionalists
132 Id. at 2611–12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2626–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at
2637–39 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
133 As I argued in Part I, however, Obergefell diminished the voices of opponents of same-
sex marriage.
134 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
135 Id. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens’s further analysis of the Adarand Court’s
notion of consistency and equality is apropos to understanding the same-sex marriage dispute.
The Court’s concept of “consistency” assumes that there is no significant
difference between a decision by the majority to impose a special burden
on the members of a minority race and a decision by the majority to pro-
vide a benefit to certain members of that minority notwithstanding its
incidental burden on some members of the majority. In my opinion that
assumption is untenable. There is no moral or constitutional equiva-
lence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and
one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination. Invidious discrimination
is an engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to enhance
or maintain the power of the majority. Remedial race-based preferences
reflect the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society. No
sensible conception of the Government’s constitutional obligation to
“govern impartially,” should ignore this distinction.
Id. at 243 (citations omitted).
136 WALDRON, supra note 25, at 95.
137 See id. at 95–96 (arguing that the constitutionality of hate speech should not be evalu-
ated pursuant to doctrinal tests, which would tend to legitimate debate over hate speech).
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and the faithful should be entitled to their views, whether religious or otherwise, but
they should not be constitutionally empowered to transform those views into dis-
criminatory public policy or law.138
III. LOCHNER REDUX?
The dissenters’ call for more democracy, combined with their related accusation
that the majority was resurrecting Lochner, bordered on the surreal. Justices and
scholars typically characterize the Court’s approach during the Lochner era as ani-
mated by three themes.139 First, strongly influenced by laissez-faire ideology, the
Court favored business and protected the economic marketplace from government
regulation.140 Second, the Court did not exercise judicial restraint.141 Instead, the Court
repeatedly (though not always) invalidated national and state legislative actions.142
Third, the Court often reached decisions protecting the marketplace from legislative
power by reasoning pursuant to an a priori formalism.143 The Justices claimed to dis-
cern the existence, content, and boundaries of certain preexisting categories of activ-
ities without inquiring into the consequences of the activities.144 Often, the Justices
eschewed empirical evidence while relying on their own intuitive grasps of social
reality.145 For example, the Court deemed manufacturing an inherently local rather
than national activity, regardless of the product manufactured, the resources used, or
the social effects of the manufacturing.146
138 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
139 See infra notes 140–46 and accompanying text.
140 Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527,
538–39 (2015) (discussing the view of the Lochner Court as basing its opinions on laissez-
faire politics); see, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935).
141 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV.
43, 50 (1989) (discussing Lochner era Court’s “aggressively” striking down federal and
state statutes).
142 Id.; see, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating
minimum wage law), overruled by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). For
an example of the Court upholding a law during the Lochner era, see Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding constitutionality of maximum hours law for women), superseded
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964).
143 FELDMAN, supra note 95, at 352 (discussing Lochner era Court’s formalist approach
and absence of concern for real-world consequences of its decisions).
144 Id. at 352.
145 Id.
146 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). In Lochner, the majority concluded,
despite contrary evidence, that the job of a baker was not “unhealthy” to “the common under-
standing.” Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905). A crucial, but often overlooked, com-
ponent of Lochner-era adjudication was the Court’s focus on the definition of the common
good. The Court would invalidate actions that were deemed class legislation or pursuits of
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The conservative dissenters in Obergefell correctly observed that the Court re-
pudiated Lochner around 1937.147 But then the dissenters turned the world on its head:
for years now, the conservative Justices themselves have been resurrecting aspects
of Lochner while undermining democratic government. First, empirical studies show
that the Roberts Court is the most pro-business Supreme Court since World War II.148
Five of the current Justices, including the four Obergefell dissenters, rank among
the top ten Justices most favorable to business during that time.149 Alito and Roberts
are first and second on the list.150 The evidence also suggests that the pro-business
Justices shape the Court’s docket in accord with their interests.151 A study focusing on
the period from May 19, 2009, to August 15, 2012, concluded that the U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce, representing businesses, filed more certiorari-stage amicus briefs
than any other organization.152 Unsurprisingly, the Chamber had the second highest
success rate.153
partial or private interests. The Court would uphold only government actions in pursuit of the
common good. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating the Railroad
Retirement Act as class legislation); see also HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED:
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993) (discussing
the Lochner era). After 1937, the Court largely stopped reviewing government actions for con-
sistency with the common good. FELDMAN, supra note 95, at 354–58. For this reason, compar-
isons between Lochner-era and more recent substantive due process cases, such as Obergefell
and Roe v. Wade, are tenuous. Stephen M. Feldman, Unenumerated Rights in Different Dem-
ocratic Regimes, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 47–50 (2006).
147 Numerous books have described this judicial transition. See generally BARRY CUSHMAN,
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
(1998); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN (1995).
148 Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431
(2013) (quantitative study of all post-war business-related cases); see Corey Ciocchetti, The
Constitution, the Roberts Court, and Business, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 385 (2013)
(emphasizing how strongly the Roberts Court supported business in the 2011–2012 term).
149 Epstein et al., supra note 148, at 1449–51, 1472–73.
150 Id. at 1449. Some conservatives have argued the Roberts Court is not conservative
enough, that it is not truly pro-business. Ramesh Ponnuru, Supreme Court Isn’t Pro-Business,
But Should Be, BLOOMBERG (July 5, 2011), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2011-07
-05/supreme-court-isn-t-pro-business-but-should-be-ramesh-ponnuru [http://perma.cc/Z5Q4
-M73Z]; see also Jonathan H. Adler, Business, the Environment, and the Roberts Court: A
Preliminary Assessment, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 943 (2009); Eric Posner, Is the Supreme
Court Biased in Favor of Business?, SLATE: CONVICTIONS (March 17, 2008), http://www
.slate.com/blogs/convictions/2008/03/17/is_the_supreme_court_biased_in_favor_of_business
.html [http://perma.cc/K9R9-9MJJ]. But empirical studies have persuasively shown otherwise.
MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS COURT 213 (2013);
see id. at 187–214 (discussing the evidence).
151 Adam Chandler, Cert.-Stage Amicus “All Stars”: Where Are They Now?, SCOTUSBLOG
(Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/cert-stage-amicus-all-stars-where-are-they
-now/ [http://perma.cc/87KQ-VN8E].
152 Id.
153 Id.
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Second, the conservative Justices are generally hostile toward the exercise of
legislative power.154 Indeed, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have engaged in one
of the “most notable binges of congressional-law striking in history.”155 The Rehnquist
Court, including Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy, invalidated more congressional acts
than had any previous Court.156 From 1995 to 2001 alone, the Court struck down thirty
federal laws, more than the Warren Court invalidated from 1953 to 1969.157 Statisti-
cally, compared with the Rehnquist Court, the Roberts Court has slowed the pace,
invalidating fewer laws proportionally.158 Yet, the current conservative Justices have
reached aggressively to strike progressive laws that are inconsistent with the con-
temporary conservative political agenda—particularly laws regulating the economic
marketplace.159 Indeed, one can reasonably characterize the conservative Justices as
market fundamentalists: they have protected corporations and the marketplace from
government regulation in case after case.160
154 See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (invalidating a section of the
Voting Rights Act); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (invalidating
part of the Affordable Care Act); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (invalidating
provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002). Thomas Keck has compiled a
list of federal statutes invalidated by the Court from 1981 to 2013. Thomas Keck, Why Does
the Supreme Court Invalidate Federal Statutes?, http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/tmkeck/Book
_1/federal_statutes.htm [http://perma.cc/NR3L-N674].
155 Barry Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Theory, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
149, 161 (2004).
156 See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER 31 (8th ed. 2008).
157 THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY 2 (2004).
158 From 2005 to 2013, the Roberts Court struck down only fifteen federal laws. Keck,
supra note 154.
159 See ALL. FOR JUSTICE, THE ROBERTS COURT AND JUDICIAL OVERREACH (2013); Lee
Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Is the Roberts Court Especially Activist? A Study of Invali-
dating (and Upholding) Federal, State, and Local Laws, 61 EMORY L.J. 737, 737–38 (2012);
Keith E. Whittington, The Least Activist Supreme Court in History? The Roberts Court and the
Exercise of Judicial Review, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2219, 2219–20 (2014).
What of the Roberts Justices? Though it may be too soon to say much
about Alito and Roberts . . . , they conform to the basic ideological pat-
tern. Both are significantly more likely to uphold conservative laws and
invalidate left-leaning policy. The ideological effect is even starker for
the more extreme conservatives, Scalia and Thomas.
Epstein & Martin, supra, at 756.
160 E.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1426 (2013) (interpreting Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to limit class actions against a corporation); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131
S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (invalidating a state law restricting corporate sale of medical data); Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (invalidating restriction on corporate campaign expen-
ditures); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (limiting punitive damage awards
against corporations); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (impos-
ing restrictive time bar for employment discrimination lawsuits against corporations), super-
seded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009);
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Third, the conservative Justices have used formalist methodology to protect the
economic marketplace and invalidate legislation.161 This judicial return to formalism
began with the conservative Justices on the Rehnquist Court in the early 1990s and
has continued with the Roberts Court.162 In the landmark commerce-power decision,
United States v. Lopez,163 decided in 1995, the Court held that Congress had exceeded
its power when it enacted the Gun-Free School Zones Act, a generally applicable law
that proscribed the possession of firearms at school.164 Rehnquist’s majority opinion,
joined by Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and O’Connor, stated that Congress can regulate
commerce in three realms: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce; (3) and activities substantially affecting interstate
commerce.165 The Court focused on the final realm, but interpreted it in accord with
a priori formalism. Rehnquist’s majority opinion distinguished between economic
and non-economic activities.166 Gun possession at schools, Rehnquist wrote, is a
non-economic enterprise that “has nothing to do with ‘commerce.’”167 Then Rehnquist
distinguished between national and local concerns.168 Gun possession at schools, he
reasoned, is a local rather than a national matter and thus falls outside Congress’s
commerce power.169 Rehnquist’s terminology, dividing “what is truly national and
what is truly local,”170 resembled the Court’s pre-1937 language separating “a purely
federal matter”171 from “a matter purely local in its character.”172 By parsing congres-
sional power pursuant to these formalist categories, the Court concluded that Congress
had exceeded its commerce power.173
see also FRED BLOCK & MARGARET R. SOMERS, THE POWER OF MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM
3 (2014) (explaining market fundamentalism). A recent decision undermining congressional
action has uncertain ramifications for the future. Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419
(2015). The Court held that a government restriction on the sale of raisins, based on a 1937 stat-
ute, was a taking and required just compensation. Id. at 2431–32.
161 Ofer Raban, Between Formalism and Conservatism: The Resurgent Legal Formalism
of the Roberts Court, 8 N.Y.U.  J.L. & LIBERTY 343, 344–47 (2014).
162 Id. (discussing the formalism of the Roberts Court). Joshua A. Klein, Commerce Clause
Questions After Morrison: Some Observations on the New Formalism and the New Realism,
55 STAN. L. REV. 571, 573–74 (2002) (discussing the formalism of the Rehnquist Court).
163 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
164 Id. at 551.
165 Id. at 558–59.
166 Id. at 561.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 567.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 567–68.
171 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 274 (1918).
172 Id. at 276.
173 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68. In two prior post-1937 cases invalidating exercises of
congressional power, the Court focused on limits imposed by the Tenth Amendment. New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding that Congress has the power to
regulate the disposal of radioactive waste per the Commerce Clause, but that power is limited
2015] (SAME) SEX, LIES, AND DEMOCRACY 363
The Roberts Court has followed Lopez and extended its formalist methodology,
most notably in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,174 which
invalidated part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).175 The Court evaluated the ACA’s
individual mandate pursuant to Congress’s commerce power.176 The individual man-
date requires most Americans to maintain “minimum essential” health insurance
coverage.177 Individuals who fail to comply with the mandate must pay a “penalty” to
the Internal Revenue Service.178 When applying the Lopez doctrine to this provision,
Roberts’s opinion articulated and applied two new formalist distinctions.179 First,
Roberts distinguished action from inaction.180 Congress, he reasoned, can regulate
activity but not inactivity pursuant to its commerce power.181 The individual man-
date would force individuals to buy health insurance even when they did not want to
do so.182 Congress therefore overstepped its commerce power, according to Roberts,
because the mandate would compel inactive individuals to enter or become active
in the health insurance market.183 Second, Roberts distinguished regulation from
creation.184 Congress can regulate but not create commerce.185 With the individual
mandate, Roberts reasoned, Congress exceeded its power by attempting to create com-
mercial activity where none previously existed.186 Roberts followed similar formalist
reasoning in concluding that Congress had surpassed its spending power in the ACA
provisions that expanded the Medicaid program.187
by the Tenth Amendment, thus prohibiting Congress from regulating state regulation); Nat’l
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1976) (holding that Congress does not have
the authority to wield its commerce power in such a way that impairs a state’s ability to struc-
ture its government employer-employee relationships), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
174 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
175 Id. at 2591.
176 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (The Congress shall have power “[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and amongst the several States.”).
177 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012).
178 Id. § 5000A(c), (g)(1).
179 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2587.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 2587–89.
182 Id. at 2589.
183 Id. at 2587. The other conservative Justices (the joint dissenters) completely agreed with
Roberts on this point, even though they did not join his opinion. Id. at 2644, 2648–49 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting).
184 Id. at 2585–86 (majority opinion).
185 Id. at 2586.
186 Again, the other conservative Justices completely agreed with Roberts on this point.
Id. at 2644 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). Roberts nonetheless upheld the
individual mandate pursuant to Congress’s taxing power. Id. at 2599–600 (majority opinion).
187 Roberts distinguished congressional “pressure” from congressional “compulsion.” Id. at
2602. Congress can provide financial incentives that pressure or encourage states to take certain
actions, but Congress cannot compel or coerce state governmental actions. With the ACA
Medicaid expansion, Roberts concluded, Congress had crossed the line from encouragement
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Given that the conservative Roberts Court Justices are pro-business, readily in-
validate legislation (particularly progressive economic legislation), and use formalist
methodology, their claim that the Obergefell majority was resurrecting Lochner was
more than a little strange. Their related call for more democracy was equally bewilder-
ing. Reading their dissenting opinions in Obergefell, one might surmise that they reg-
ularly celebrate democratic decision-making. That would be a mistake.
The conservative Justices generally follow conservative scholars who, for many
years, have been attacking democratic law-making as irrational.188 These scholars often
are skeptical of government actions, particularly regulations of the economic market-
place, and rue the Court’s rejection of the Lochner approach in 1937.189 The renowned
economist Milton Friedman is one of the leading antigovernment scholars.190 Friedman
maintains that the economic marketplace is a wondrous device because of the invis-
ible hand.191 From this perspective, the market operates so that “the voluntary actions
of millions of individuals can be coordinated through a price system without central
direction.”192 Each individual’s interests and knowledge lead him or her to pursue de-
sired goals and, simultaneously, lead society as a whole to pursue appropriate goals.193
But the government operates like a backward reflection of the marketplace, accord-
ing to Friedman.194 There is an “invisible hand in politics [that] is as potent a force for
harm as the invisible hand in economics is for good.”195 Government actors might
have the best of intentions, yet they cannot help but pursue harmful goals.196 “In
politics, men who intend only to promote the public interest, as they conceive it, are
to coercion. Id. at 2604. The joint dissenters again agreed with Roberts on this point. Id. at
2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting).
188 For instance, public choice theorists apply economic analysis to public decision-making
to show that majority voting, as in democracy, is frequently an irrational means for making
group decisions. According to public choice, when the government legislates, the legislative
decisions do not rest on a rational calculation of costs and benefits. They arise instead from
interest group machinations. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE
1–11, 38–62 (1991). See generally WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM (1982)
(arguing social choice theory calls democracy into question).
189 For criticisms of congressional power and defenses of Lochner, see RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004); DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER
(2011); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387
(1987); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 1995 REGULATION 1, 83–84 (1995)
(arguing that, post-1937, the true Constitution has been in exile). For a response to the revision-
ist defenses of Lochner, see Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History
of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751 (2009).
190 See, e.g., Milton Friedman, Adam Smith’s Relevance for 1976, in SELECTED PAPERS
no. 50.
191 Id. at 15–16.
192 Id. at 15.
193 Id. at 16–17.
194 Id. at 18–19.
195 Id. at 18.
196 Id.
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‘led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of’ their intention. They
become the front-men for special interests they would never knowingly serve.”197 Pri-
vate interests necessarily manipulate democratic processes in ways that cannot arise
in market transactions.
The conservative Justices, in numerous cases, have manifested similar skepticism
toward democratic decision-making.198 The Rehnquist Court began displaying such
skepticism in Lopez and other congressional power cases.199 The Court, for instance,
started questioning whether Congress had made sufficient findings of fact to support
its legislative actions.200 In these cases, the conservative Justices showed no respect
for congressional expertise in the legislative realm.201 Instead, the Court suggested
that Congress needed to deliberate and make more thorough and precise findings so
as to avoid committing so many egregious errors.202 This judicial request for congres-
sional findings reinstituted another dormant doctrinal mechanism from the Lochner
era.203 In a 1922 decision, to take one example, the Court invalidated a statute partly
because Congress had failed to find specific facts showing that the regulated activ-
ity burdened interstate commerce.204
The conservative Justices on the Roberts Court have continued to press for con-
gressional findings.205 In Shelby County v. Holder, a five-to-four decision, the Court
invalidated a provision of the Voting Rights Act, passed pursuant to Congress’s
power under the Fifteenth Amendment.206 The coverage provision of the Act spec-
ified which jurisdictions needed special government approval or pre-clearance be-
fore they could change their voting laws.207 The Court, in an opinion by Roberts,
197 Id.; see also F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 94–95 (Ronald Hamowy ed.,
2011) (arguing against government planning because of the complexity of social reality).
198 See infra note 199.
199 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the Violence Against
Women Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 527 (1997) (invalidating the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invali-
dating the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
200 See, e.g., infra note 202.
201 See infra note 202.
202 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562–63; see also Morrison, 529
U.S. at 615 (acknowledging congressional findings but dismissing them as inadequate).
203 See A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme
Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L.
REV.  328, 356 (2001) (describing “rigorous review of the legislative record” as characteristic
of pre-1937 Supreme Court decision-making).
204 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68–69 (1922); see also Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1,
31–38 (1923) (upholding statute similar to the one invalidated in Hill partly because Congress
made sufficient findings).
205 See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (noting that congressional
findings did not support the pre-clearance provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
206 Id. at 2630–31.
207 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 1965 U.S.C. (79 Stat.) 438 § 4(b)
(1965), invalidated in part by Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630–31 (2013).
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acknowledged that the coverage provision was sensible in 1965, when Congress
first enacted the statute.208 Congress, though, had reauthorized the Act several times
over the years,209 and the Court concluded that the coverage provision did not fit the
nation’s current circumstances.210 “Coverage today is based on decades-old data and
eradicated practices.”211 Roberts’s opinion suggested that Congress left the Court
with no choice but to invalidate the statutory provision.212 The Court, as Roberts
explained, had sidestepped a similar constitutional challenge to the Act several years
earlier and had encouraged Congress to update the coverage formula.213 “Its failure
to act leaves us today with no choice but to declare [the provision] unconstitutional. The
formula in that section can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions
to preclearance.”214
When one reads Ginsburg’s Shelby County dissent, however, the case appears re-
markably different. Ginsburg pointed to extensive and detailed congressional findings.215
Congress determined, based on a voluminous record, that the
scourge of [voting] discrimination was not yet extirpated. . . . With
overwhelming support in both Houses, Congress concluded that,
for two prime reasons, [the Act] should continue in force, un-
abated. First, continuance would facilitate completion of the
impressive gains thus far made; and second, continuance would
guard against backsliding. Those assessments were well within
Congress’ province to make and should elicit this Court’s un-
stinting approbation.216
Ginsburg’s dissent revealed the conservative majority’s disdain for Congress and
its democratic processes.217 The Court did not merely ask Congress to make more
208 Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625.
209 Id. at 2620–21.
210 Id. at 2628 (“In 1965, the States could be divided into two groups: those with a recent
history of voting tests and low voter registration and turnout, and those without those char-
acteristics. Congress based its coverage formula on that distinction. Today the Nation is no
longer divided along those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if it were.”).
211 Id. at 2627.
212 Id. (“As we explained, a statute’s ‘current burdens’ must be justified by ‘current needs,’
and any ‘disparate geographic coverage’ must be ‘sufficiently related to the problem that it tar-
gets.’ The coverage formula met that test in 1965, but no longer does so.” (citations omitted)).
213 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009) (holding that
the Supreme Court would apply the principle of constitutional avoidance to the question of the
constitutionality of pre-clearance requirements).
214 Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631. “Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to
remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.” Id.
215 Id. at 2635–36, 2642–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 2632–33.
217 Id. at 2644.
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specific findings. Rather, the Court demanded that Congress make different findings.
In short, it is unclear whether any congressional findings would have satisfied the con-
servative Justices, given that they apparently did not approve of Congress’s action.
One should not miss the significance of the Shelby County decision. The Court
not only demeaned Congress’s democratic law-making, but also facilitated further
discriminatory attacks on the democratic process. In recent years, more than thirty-one
states have enacted laws restricting voting.218 For instance, the Voter Information
Verification Act of North Carolina not only requires voters to present government-
issued photo identification at the polls but also shortens the early voting period, ends
pre-registration for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, and eliminates same-day voter
registration.219 Under the Texas Voter Identification law, an individual who presents
a concealed-gun permit can vote, but an individual with a student photo ID cannot.220
A Pew Center study discovered that “at least 51 million eligible U.S. citizens are un-
registered, or more than 24% of the eligible population.”221 For purposes of compari-
son, more than 93% of eligible voters in Canada are registered.222 To be clear, many
American citizens do not participate because they are purposefully discouraged or
prevented from doing so, not because they are apathetic. The new disenfranchisement
laws tend to discriminate especially against those lacking money, leisure time, and
bureaucratic know-how.223
218 Voting Laws Roundup 2015, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 3, 2015), https://www
.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-laws-roundup-2015 [http://perma.cc/49LW-S77J].
219 Summary of Voter ID Laws Passed Since 2011, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 12,
2013) [hereinafter Summary of Voter ID Laws], https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voter
-id-laws-passed-2011 [http://perma.cc/WA3H-47GV]; Aaron Blake, North Carolina Governor
Signs Extensive Voter ID Law, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/post-politics/wp/2013/08/12/north-carolina-governor-signs-extensive-voter-id-law/
[http://perma.cc/9M23-2ART].
220 Summary of Voter ID Laws, supra note 219, at 13–14; Rick Lyman, Texas’ Stringent
Voter ID Law Makes a Dent at Polls, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/11/07/us/politics/texas-stringent-voter-id-law-makes-a-dent-at-polls.html?_r=0. The Fifth
Circuit held that this law violated the Voting Rights Act in part but did not constitute an un-
constitutional poll tax. Veasey v. Abbott, No. 14-41127, 2015 WL 4645642 (5th Cir. 2015).
221 PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, INACCURATE, COSTLY, AND INEFFICIENT: EVIDENCE THAT
AMERICA’S VOTER REGISTRATION SYSTEM NEEDS AN UPGRADE 1 (Feb. 14, 2012).
222 Id. at 8.
223 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY 163 (2012 ed.); Walter Dean
Burnham, Democracy in Peril: The American Turnout Problem and the Path to Plutocracy
2–11, 25 (The Roosevelt Inst., Working Paper No. 5, 2010) (comparing voting franchisement
and turnout over the past century in the United States with that of European countries to demon-
strate how elites have “gamed the machinery of elections”); Alexander Keyssar, The Squeeze
on Voting, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 15, 2012 (noting that new voter laws have a dispropor-
tionate impact on immigrants, blue-collar workers, and the poor). The conservative Justices
might claim that they have sought to protect state sovereignty from federal overreaching. In
other words, according to this federalism outlook, they are not hostile to democratic govern-
ment; they are hostile to national power. This claim, however, is difficult to square with the
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CONCLUSION
Obergefell neither manifests a judicial attack on democracy nor a resurrection
of Lochner. Contrary to the dissenters’ arguments, the Justices who have been under-
mining democratic law-making and reinstituting Lochner-era judicial themes are the
four conservative dissenters themselves (often joined by Kennedy). Regardless, as
the dissenters suggested, Obergefell crystallized a dispute over voice. The Court had
to decide between the proponents of same-sex marriage and the opponents, inspired
by traditional values and religious convictions. The loser’s voice necessarily would
be diminished.
The Court decided correctly. Discrimination against gays and lesbians should
no longer be open to debate. Discriminatory laws, whether with regard to marriage or
otherwise, necessarily undermine the democratic process. Thus, by preventing unequal
treatment of gays and lesbians in marriage, Obergefell ultimately bolstered rather
than harmed democracy.
broad negative ramifications for democracy of Shelby County. Plus, this claim is in tension
with the numerous cases in which the Court has invalidated state and local government actions.
See, e.g., Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (invalidating
state law restricting corporate political campaign expenditures); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs.
Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (invalidating state law prohibiting the sale or rental of violent
video games to minors); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (invalidating
state law restricting the sale of medical data); Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701 (2007) (invalidating urban school districts’ affirmative action programs); see Fisher
v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (emphasizing that state affirmative action
program must be evaluated pursuant to strict scrutiny).
